increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature” (8). All of the “multiplicities” are even. There is the possibility of being fractures. Perhaps, they are shattered or broken but the point is that they will launch to grow again. This characteristic of rhizome is called “principle of signifying rupture” (9). The same notion can be seen in this play in which Krapp does not have any root and he does not belong to any base thing.
Furthermore, “rhizome” is considered as a map and repeatedly mutates the object. Maps tend to experiment and adapt but “tracing” tries to codify. So, all religions are “tracing”. This feature of rhizome is called “principle of cartography and decalcomania” (12). At the end, Deleuze and Guattari sum up “rhizome” and “arbre” in this way:
A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things inter being, intermezzo. The tree is a filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb “to be”, but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, “and….and…..and……” this conjunction carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb “to be”. The middle is by no means an average; on the contrary it is where things pick up speed. Between things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps on and the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle (25).
What is significant here is that ‘rhizome” paves the way for “becoming”. So that it can be construed in direct relation with becoming. As Mary Bryden acknowledges this issue in Gilles Deleuze Travels in Literature ” A rhizome provides for Deleuze and Guattari a hard-working figure of becomings since rhizomes proliferate through underground, horizontal networks rather than by the vertical, rooted structure associated with tree” (5). Inna Semetskey delineates “becoming” from Deleuze and Guattari’s vantage point as “the subject-in -process, that is, as becoming, is always placed between two multiplicities, yet one term does not become the other; the becoming is something between the two, this something called by Deleuze a pure effect” (6).
In this way, I would like to emphasize that, Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is philosophy of “becoming” which turns Platonism on its side (125). Due to his reliance on being Plato declared that everything in the world is indeed the copy of an “ideal” world which in its own turn the work of artists is the copy of the copy. As a result what he does is placing a ground or foundation which is completely at odds with “becoming”. Colebrook asserts that Deleuzean philosophy is “anti-humanism” due to rejecting human being “as the knower of the world” (126). From Deleuze’s vantage point, we don’t consider ourselves as fixed “perceivers” who “set over and against life” (128). On the contrary, we submerge ourselves in life’s flow and becoming “hybrid with what is not itself….. from life itself we imagine all the becomings of life, using the human power of imagination to overcome the human” (129). In this respect, while Descartes asserts “‘Jepense, donc Je Suis'” meaning “I think, therefore, I am” and centers a subject who perceives, Deleuze gets away with foundation and immerses himself in movement by saying “‘Je rencontre, Je fuis, Je me deplace, donc Je suis'” meaning “I encounter, I flee, I move around, therefore, I am” (qtd. in Bryden 8).
Moreover, identity in this philosophy is not imagined as a fixed entity like all things, it is in interaction with all other entities and is defined through difference. Sometskey in his description of Deleuzean “becoming” delineates that “one’s identity….. is always contested: the seemingly paradoxical element of changing one’s identity leads to self-identity itself losing its stable meaning. It reflects on the dynamics of becoming other and discarding or transforming the values that were once established” (Anti-Oedipus12). The search for self-discovery, a common theme in literature, often involves a main character that finds his or her identity after a progression of experiences. However, Samuel Beckett, the groundbreaking absurdist playwright of the twentieth century, frequently creates characters that ultimately never discover personal identities. Although his characters, like the famous Krapp of Krapp’s Last Tape, fail to create identities for themselves, they brilliantly portray the existence of the individual as well as the absurdity of the human condition. In his play Krapp’s Last Tape, Samuel Beckett portrays a single character, Krapp, whose failure to achieve personal continuity makes the search for identity impossible based on his perception of life as a progression of details, his interruption of recorded memories, and his disparity between fragmented selves.
All in all, Deleuze and Guattari seek something that is conducive to “power of becoming” and in their opinion literature, philosophy and art are suitable exemplars of that due to their inventing of effects that transform our experience (Colebrook 126). In particular, Semetskey believes that Deleuze and Guattari’s “rhizome” can be contemplated in the “context of literature and of travel for two reasons” (5). Firstly, literature is considered to be traversing space, their applicability is travel-oriented. Furthermore, he doesn’t characterize travelling as being operated “in punctual manner from A to B, but along a continuum, with variations in speed and intensity. In this context, questions of origin and terminus are relegated”(6).
In other words, aborescence is like a tree, it is solid and fixed. In this position subjectivity comparable with rhizme is totally fixed and unchangeable, this is a fixed classical view of human being. Man is center of the world, man is self-sufficient. To apply this tenet to Beckett’s theatre I would claim that Beckett’s protagonist, Krapp, has potential to be brought in line with Deleuzean aborescence. Based on this point of view, one can see that Krapp at the age of 29 years old is aborescence, he is a complete self. He tries to get along with his world while he has center in life, a hope to fulfill his dream. On the contrary, Rhizme is totally decentered. It has no point center is decentered. There is no hierarchy anymore. Man takes on the position of a machine. He doesn’t take higher position of the world or society. Better today subject is objectified; I am a part of the machine as a human. Krapp is completely shattered at the age of 69. All these issues are compatible with the process of becoming in Krapp’s world in order to lead his life into becoming. Krapp and the cage that he lives in have kinship with rhizome which is not adaptable to structural model. In this play, subject is objectified, Krapp does not have any value as a human so there is no hierarchy anymore. Man does not have any value in the world as much as before. So Krapp is becoming tape and sound and silence in order to negate his humanity through this chaotic situation. Unlike his 29 year old time that was linked with root and fixed point and definite destination; however, the rhizomatic Krapp compound seems to be moving one line of multiplicities that connect them with tape, sound and silence.
2.2.1 Becoming Imperceptible
The supposed real world that would lie behind the flux of becoming is not, Deleuze insists, a stable world of being; there ‘is’ nothing other than the flow of becoming. All ‘beings’ are just relatively stable moments in a flow of becoming-life. The obstacle to thinking becoming, according to Deleuze, is humanism and subjectivism. Both these tendencies posit some ground for becoming: either the human as the knower of a world that becomes, or a subject that underlies becoming.
For Deleuze life begins with pure difference or becoming, or tendencies to differ – such as the differential waves of sound and light, and these differences are then actualized by different points of perception: such as the human eye. Our worlds of beings, the extended terms that we perceive, are contractions of flows of becoming. For the most part we do not perceive becoming; we only perceive
a world as transcendent, a world of external and extended things. But it is possible, especially through art, not just to refer our sense experiences to a world of experienced things. We can also experience sensibility itself: not a sensible contracted and organized according to the specific interests of the perceiver. Deleuze refers to this as the ‘being of the sensible’ (Deleuze 1994). A singularity is just this becoming of the sensible, the virtual power of the sensible, its untimely possibility.
To a certain extent, then, we can think of art and its presentation of singularities as a ‘becoming-imperceptible’. We become perceivable and extended bodies, or located perceivers, by contracting from the complex flow of life. We reduce the chaos of perceptions that we receive into an extended object, and can become ‘subjects’ who observe this object. By contrast, we become imperceptible – no longer disengaged from life and difference – by becoming one with the flow of images that is life. Instead of being an image set over against the world, such as a mind that receives impressions, we recognize ourselves as nothing more than a flow of images, the brain being one image among others, one possible perception and not the origin of perceptions.
The human becomes more than itself, or expands to its highest power, not by affirming

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